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WORKSITE RAIDS AND IMMIGRATION NORMS:
A “STICKY” PROBLEM
I.

INTRODUCTION

Even as 2008 saw a relative lull in the heated immigration debates that
fixated America’s democratic and academic institutions in 2006 and 2007, the
issues continue to simmer unresolved. Legislators continue to propose
reforms,1 even as older bills 2 stall. Interest groups challenge government
regulations.3 Political candidates square off against one another.4 Scholars
and commentators analyze the laws and proposals. 5 Yet as the debates rage,
employers and immigrants largely ignore the laws, and the government
continues to devise its own regulatory strategy. Absent effective enforcement,
the policy debate is irrelevant.
In devising an effective immigration regulation strategy, it is critical to
distinguish the ends from the means. Adam Cox and Eric Posner identify two
distinct issues that shape immigration regulation. 6 The first are policy
decisions, so-called ―first-order‖ issues. 7 Here, the government makes
decisions regarding the quantity and type of admissible immigrants as well as
the terms of their admission. 8 Next are the institutional design questions, or
―second-order‖ issues.9 Here, the government makes decisions regarding the
institutional and regulatory system that counts, sorts, and screens

1. See, e.g., Protect Citizens and Residents from Unlawful Raids and Detention Act, S. 3594,
110th Cong. (2008).
2. See, e.g., Secure Borders FIRST (For Integrity, Reform, Safety, and Anti-Terrorism) Act of
2007, H.R. 2954, 110th Cong.; Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2007, S. 1639, 110th
Cong.; Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong.; Border Protection,
Antiterrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong.; Secure America
and Orderly Immigration Act, S. 1033, 109th Cong. (2005).
3. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Revised Rule for Employers that Hire Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
25, 2007, at A34.
4. See, e.g., Michael Cooper & Marc Santora, Candidates Firm on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 2007, at A1; NPR Democratic Candidates Debate (National Public Radio broadcast Dec. 4,
2007), transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16898435.
5. See generally, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of
Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2007); Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of
Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193.
6. Cox & Posner, supra note 5, at 814–22.
7. Id. at 814.
8. Id. at 814–17.
9. Id. at 819–20.
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immigrants.10 Too often, however, the government fails to distinguish
between first- and second-order issues; that is, the ends become blurred with
the means.
The consequences of this perceptive failure are cyclical. First, secondorder design flaws go unnoticed, or at least, under-analyzed. Instead, the
government equates a lack of results with lax enforcement. The government
inevitably ―solves‖ this problem with more aggressive or intrusive
enforcement of the flawed second-order systems. The resulting ―solutions‖
do not remedy the real second-order design flaw but instead perpetuate or
even aggravate the existing one.
Indeed, such a perceptive failure is likely occurring today with the
government’s employer sanctioning laws. Widespread failures are attributed
to fraud and remedied with aggressive enforcement practices. 11 If these
failures persist, immigration reform is effectively impossible. That is, firstorder decisions (e.g., guest-worker programs, paths to citizenship, etc.) will
give way to the de facto illegal immigrant system that exists today. 12
This Comment suggests that one of the unnoticed design flaws of the
current employer regulation regime is that it runs counter to social norms. For
years, the government has considered fraudulent documents to be the greatest
cause of unauthorized employment in America,13 but perhaps it is not.
Because of fraudulent documents, 14 many employers cannot follow the law
even if they want to because they cannot tell legal workers from illegal ones.
Perhaps the more significant reason is that many employers have adopted proillegal immigrant norms. Such norms would undermine the enforcement of
immigration laws in several ways. Critically, they could fuel a backlash
against an aggressive antifraud campaign, which is exactly the direction in
which current policy is headed.
This Comment will focus exclusively on second-order immigration issues
and will not address first-order immigration policies. Part II of this Comment
will describe the current employer sanctioning laws and their origins. Part III
will describe employer sanctioning in practice as well as legislative proposals
for reform. Part IV will outline a social-science model of social norms and
will examine immigration norms through that model.

10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
See infra Part III.B.
Cox & Posner, supra note 5, at 844–45.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT : WEAKNESSES HINDER
EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION AND WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 5 (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05813.pdf [hereinafter IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT].
14. Id.
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II. EMPLOYER SANCTIONING LAWS
In the early 1980s, when Americans perceived Mexican migration to have
reached crisis levels, public pressure for employer sanctions mounted. 15 In
fact, by 1981, a majority of Americans favored the idea of employer sanctions
to control immigration. 16 It seemed obvious that prohibiting the unauthorized
employment of immigrants would curb the flow of economic migration. 17
Reducing immigrants’ access to jobs and income would reduce the flow of
aliens into the United States and simultaneously prompt the voluntary
departure of many already present.18
Enforcing an employment prohibition appears simple and logical.
Legislators intuitively rely on general deterrence and criminalization models
to establish an enforcement regime. 19 For one, such a regime ―appear[s]
costless.‖20 The infrastructure is already in place and thus requires no
additional resources. 21 The new laws simply become new tools for judges,
prosecutors, and investigators. Furthermore, the deterrence model fits with
certain philosophical22 and economic ideas of human behavior.23 And if the
initial scheme is not successful, lawmakers can even increase penalties with
very little cost.24 Indeed, by 1982, many Western nations 25 and at least ten
states had already implemented employer sanction regimes.26

15. NICHOLAS LAHAM, RONALD REAGAN AND THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM 94
(2000) (citing a 1981 poll revealing an ―overwhelming majority‖ in favor of employer sanctions).
16. Id.
17. See Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Policy: Thinking Outside the (Big) Box, 39 CONN. L. REV.
1401, 1426 (2007) (calling the sanctioning of U.S. employers ―the most obvious method[]‖ of
reducing illegal immigration).
18. See, e.g., Stephanie E. Tanger, Enforcing Corporate Responsibility for Violations of
Workplace Immigration Laws: The Case of Meatpacking, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 59, 60 (2006);
Steven A. Camarota, Use Enforcement to Ease Situation, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 23, 2005, available
at http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/camerataoped1005.html (predicting that with increased
enforcement immigrants would ―self-deport‖).
19. See Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U.
L. REV. 655, 668–69 (2006) (explaining legislatures’ propensity for ―fiat‖).
20. See id. at 668.
21. Id. In the case of immigration enforcement, Congress would rely upon the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) as well as the Department of Labor (DOL). See infra note 39.
22. Cheng, supra note 19, at 668.
23. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968) (discussing ―how many resources and how much punishment should be used to
enforce different kinds of legislation‖).
24. See id. at 183–84.
25. Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and
Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 679 (1997) (citing GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
INFORMATION ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS REGARDING EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS IN SELECTED
COUNTRIES (1982)). The notable exception to this trend was Great Britain. Id. at 679.
26. Carl E. Schwarz, Employer Sanctions Laws, Worker Identification Systems, and
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Following suit in 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA), creating a number of criminal and civil sanctions for
employers who hired illegal immigrants. 27 The law reflected a compromise
between labor and business interests. 28 For labor groups seeking to reduce the
number of foreigners in the workforce, it became illegal for an employer to
hire or employ an ―unauthorized alien.‖ 29 But for employers, nervous about
civil and criminal liability, good faith was a complete defense.30
The resulting compromise required employers to verify and attest to the
legal status of each of their employees on a standard I-9 form. 31 Under this
system, an employer’s duties appear fairly simple. 32 First, within three days
of hiring any new employee, the employer must ―physically examine‖ the
employee’s identification documents.33 During this inspection, the employer
must determine whether the documents ―appear to be genuine and to relate to
the [employee].‖34 If satisfied, the employer must attest to compliance under
the penalty of perjury. 35 At its core, the employer’s duty is not unlike a bar
owner’s duty to verify the age of prospective consumers of alcohol.
An employer who fails to comply with the above procedures would face a
wide range of civil and criminal punishments. For example, an employer who
simply fails to comply with the I-9 documentation requirements could be
fined as little as $110.36 In contrast, an employer who engages in ―a pattern or
practice‖ of hiring illegal immigrants could face six months in prison. 37
Today, an employer typically faces a $2200 fine for a first offense. 38 Any
Undocumented Aliens: The State Experience and Federal Proposals, 19 STAN. J. INT ’L L. 371, 373
(1983).
27. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see Medina,
supra note 25, at 671.
28. See NANCY HUMEL MONTWIELER, THE IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW OF 1986: ANALYSIS,
TEXT, AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 10 (1987).
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)–(2) (2006).
30. Id. § 1324a(b)(6); see Developments in the Law—Jobs and Borders, Legal Protections for
Illegal Workers, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2224, 2240 (2005) (―Completion of the I-9 generally insulates
the employer from liability . . . .‖); see also 8 C.F.R. § 274a.4 (2008) (―An employer . . . who shows
good faith compliance with the employment verification requirements . . . shall have established a
rebuttable affirmative defense that the person or entity has not violated section 274A(a)(1)(A) of the
Act with respect to such hiring, recruiting, or referral.‖).
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A).
32. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.
33. Id. § 274a.2(b)(1)(ii)(A). For a complete list of acceptable identification documents, see id.
§ 274a.2(b)(1)(v)(A)(1)–(5).
34. Id. § 274a.2(b)(1)(ii)(A).
35. Id. § 274a.2(a)(3).
36. Id. § 274a.10(b)(2).
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1) (2006).
38. Julia Preston, Farmers Call Crackdown on Illegal Workers Unfair, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11,
2007, at A10.
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individual who knows of a violation, or potential violation, of the above laws
may file a written complaint with Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE).39 The agency may then conduct an investigation and issue either a
―Notice of Intent to Fine‖ or a ―Warning Notice.‖ 40 At this point, an
employer may request a hearing before an administrative law judge regarding
the violation. 41
In practice, these sanctions have placed employers in an awkward
position.42 As one commentator stated, businesses were ―deputize[d]‖ in the
―fight against illegal immigration.‖ 43 But rather than train and fund these new
―deputies,‖ authorities increasingly tend to coerce them.44
III. EMPLOYER REGULATION IN PRACTICE
Although the statutory framework underlying worksite enforcement has
remained largely unchanged for the past two decades, the priorities and
strategies of the enforcement agencies have varied tremendously. Until 2001,
both government and business simply ignored the laws.45 After the terrorist
attacks of 2001, the government used the laws to regulate ―critical
infrastructure‖ jobs like airport security. 46 Then, after legislative immigration
reform efforts failed very publicly in 2005 and 2006, the government began
relying heavily on deterrence through highly publicized worksite raids and
employer sanctions.
In addition to coercing compliance from reluctant ―deputies,‖ the
government also developed several methods of assisting more cooperative
employers. Specifically, the government knew that fraudulent documents and
identity theft had severely undermined employers’ ability to comply with the

39. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9(a). Initially, the enforcement of employment
regulation fell upon the INS, within the U.S. Department of Justice. See IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 13, at 1 n.2. In 2003, however, Congress shifted these responsibilities to
ICE, within the new Department of Homeland Security. Id.
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(1)–(2); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9(b)–(d).
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9(e).
42. See Thomas C. Green & Ileana Ciobanu, Deputizing—And Then Prosecuting—America’s
Businesses in the Fight Against Illegal Immigration, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1203, 1204–05 (2006);
Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration Enforcement, 2006 U.
ILL. L. REV. 887, 889–90.
43. Green & Ciobanu, supra note 42, at 1204.
44. See infra Part III.
45. See Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a Dialectical Model of WhiteCollar Crime, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1041, 1050–51 (1990) (describing the early years of
enforcement).
46. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 13, at 30–31.
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laws.47 It sought to develop strategies of technology and intergovernmental
collaboration to assist employers with widespread document fraud.48
A. General Neglect During the Early Years
From 1986 to 2005, employer sanctions were a relatively low priority,
even among the agencies charged with immigration regulation.49 For
example, between 1994 and 1998 the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) devoted less than two percent of its resources to enforcing worksite
compliance. 50 In real terms, a U.S. General Accounting Office audit
estimated that the INS committed the equivalent of 300 full-time employees
to employer monitoring in 1998. 51 As a point of reference, there were an
estimated 200,000 employers employing millions of unauthorized workers at
the time. 52 The number actually declined for the next five years until 2003,
when only ninety employees were committed to such responsibilities. 53 And
indeed, following September 11, 2001, the INS’s efforts were directed mainly
at ―critical infrastructure‖ jobs (e.g., airport security, nuclear energy, etc.). 54
By 2003 and 2004, federal regulators were barely fining employers. ICE
issued only three notices of intent to fine in 200455 and prosecuted only four
employers in 2003. 56 ICE collected a mere $6500 in fines in 2005.57 In
comparison, in 2004, the Department of Labor (DOL) assessed more than $4
million in fines against employers convicted of violating child labor laws. 58
By any standard, the enforcement of immigration laws against employers was
a low priority.

47. See, e.g., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL ALIENS : SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES TO
REDUCING UNAUTHORIZED ALIEN EMPLOYMENT EXIST 9 (1999), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99033.pdf [hereinafter ILLEGAL ALIENS].
48. Id. at 11, 18.
49. Id. at 15–18.
50. Id. at 16. In contrast, the INS was spending seventy percent of its resources on border
inspections and patrols. Id. at 17 fig.1.
51. Id. at 16. This number is an estimation based on the concept of ―workyears,‖ by which the
INS maintained internal records. Id.
52. Id. at 17.
53. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 13, at 32.
54. Id. at 32 n.53.
55. Id. at 35 fig.4; Spencer S. Hsu & Kari Lydersen, Illegal Hiring Is Rarely Penalized, WASH.
POST, June 19, 2006, at A1.
56. Hsu & Lydersen, supra note 55.
57. Press Release, ICE, ICE Arrests 28 Workers at Area Nursery, Landscaping Business (Apr.
25, 2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/080425elpaso.htm.
58. DOL, WAGE & HOUR DIV., 2004 STATISTICS FACT SHEET, available at
http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/statistics/200411.htm.
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These minimal efforts had little effect, and employers largely ignored the
law. 59 By March 2005, illegal immigrants constituted approximately five
percent of the total U.S. labor force. 60 That proportion was greater still in the
low-wage, low-skill labor markets.61 For example, nearly a quarter of the
nation’s agricultural workers were unauthorized. 62
Similarly, illegal
immigrants made up more than ten percent of the nation’s cleaning,
construction, and food service workers. 63
In light of the government’s failure to stem the flow of immigrants, some
commentators called for the abandonment of employer sanctions as a means
of immigration regulation.64 Far from giving up, however, the government
responded to its failures by redoubling its efforts.
B. High-Profile Crackdowns
Beginning in 2006, the government implemented a series of high-profile
crackdowns on companies that employed illegal aliens. 65 It relied more
heavily on criminal prosecutions and the seizure of company assets, rather
than civil fines.66 Many of the targets were big businesses that employ many
illegal aliens.67 After years of investigations, officers would raid a business
and sometimes arrest employers and supervisors. 68 The government followed
the raids with massive criminal prosecutions of the immigrant employees for
identity theft.69 Tellingly, in 2007, approximately one-tenth of ICE’s worksite
enforcement criminal arrests were of supervisors. 70
59. See Calavita, supra note 45, at 1050–51. For example, in a survey of immigrant-dependent
employers taken in the immediate aftermath of the IRCA, eight percent of employers said that the
law did not affect their hiring practices ―in any way.‖ Id.
60. JEFFREY S. P ASSEL, PEW HISP. CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT P OPULATION IN THE U.S. 9 (2006), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf.
61. Id. at 11.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Hing, supra note 17, at 1401; Wishnie, supra note 5, at 193.
65. See, e.g., Press Release, ICE, Factsheet: Worksite Enforcement (Nov. 25, 2008), available
at
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/worksite.htm
[hereinafter
Worksite
Factsheet]
(documenting a dramatic increase in administrative and criminal arrests through worksite raids in
2006 and 2007); Steven Greenhouse, Immigrant Crackdown Upends A Slaughterhouse’s Work
Force, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2007, at A1 (reporting a raid on the world’s largest hog butchering plant
and another on a poultry plant that netted more than 100 workers).
66. Worksite Factsheet, supra note 65.
67. See Greenhouse, supra note 65.
68. Worksite Factsheet, supra note 65.
69. Julia Preston, 270 Immigrants Sent to Prison in Federal Push, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2008,
at A1.
70. Worksite Factsheet, supra note 65. According to the fact sheet, of the 2007 criminal
arrests, ―more than 90 individuals [were] in company supervisory chains.‖ Id. There were 863 total
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High-profile raids on big businesses are attractive to ICE as an efficient
deterrence strategy. This is in part because when ICE raids a large employer,
agents may detain hundreds of illegal immigrants. The numbers help capture
headlines, which in turn serve as a warning to other employers. Then, even if
the employer is never prosecuted, the raid should nevertheless have a
deterrent effect on employers and employees. Because investigations of
employers may be costly and time-consuming,71 raids on large employers
appear to be efficient.
The government took the first step in 2005 when ICE began to dedicate
greater resources to worksite enforcement. 72 Although it is difficult to
determine how many more resources ICE has committed to worksite
enforcement, a 2007 Government Accountability Office audit suggests a
significant increase. 73 Specifically, government auditors found that between
2003 and 2007 there had been a ―six-fold increase in the number of new
officers dedicated to worksite enforcement operations.‖ 74
As a result of the strategy shift and increased resources, employers have
faced increasing criminal sanctions. 75 In 2007, for example, a California
fence building company forfeited nearly $5 million, and a federal judge
sentenced its president and vice president to serve six months’ house arrest
and to pay six-figure fines.76 ―Meaningful employer sanctions . . . are an
important component of criminal enforcement of illegal immigration across
our border with Mexico,‖ said United States Attorney Karen P. Hewitt. 77
Further evidence of the increased sanctions can be found in the recent large

criminal arrests that year. Id.
71. The raid of one Iowa meatpacker cost ICE an estimated $5.2 million. William Petroski,
Taxpayers’ Costs Top $5 Million For Raid at Postville, DES MOINES REGISTER, Oct. 14, 2008, at
1A.
72. See GOV ’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: ICE COULD
IMPROVE CONTROLS TO HELP GUIDE ALIEN REMOVAL DECISION MAKING 23–24 & fig.2 (2007),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0867.pdf.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 23. However, because 2003 was a low point in worksite enforcement operations,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 13, at 33 fig.3, this number reflects a bit of bureaucratic
back-patting.
75. The total dollar amount of criminal sanctions in 2007 was over $30 million. Worksite
Factsheet, supra note 65; see also Preston, supra note 38 (quoting DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff
as claiming a record number of felony criminal charges against employers in 2006 and 2007).
76. See, e.g., Press Release, ICE, Company Executives Sentenced for Hiring Illegal Alien
Workers
(Mar.
28,
2007),
available
at
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/070328sandiego.htm; $5 Million Fine for Hiring
Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2006, at A38.
77. ICE, supra note 76.

2009]

WORKSITE RAIDS AND IMMIGRATION NORMS

599

settlements. For example, ICE agreed to an $11 million settlement with WalMart for employing illegal aliens in twenty-one states.78
The raids of two large meatpacking plants exemplify ICE’s deterrencebased raid strategy. The largest of such raids occurred on December 12, 2006,
when ICE raided plants owned by Swift and Co., a meatpacking business. 79
The raids resulted in more worksite arrests than ICE had made in all of fiscal
year 2005 and more than a third of all administrative arrests made in 2006.80
A similar raid took place in 2008 at the nation’s largest kosher
meatpacking plant.81 Beginning in early 2006, ICE learned of widespread
immigration and labor violations at the Postville, Iowa, plant from a number
of former employees and managers. 82 A former manager told ICE that as
many as eighty percent of the company’s workers were not authorized to work
in the United States.83 On May 12, 2008, ICE raided the facilities and
detained nearly 400 employees.84
The consequences of this particular raid have been tremendous. For the
immigrants, several hundred were sent to federal prison on identity theft
charges.85 For the owners, the state of Iowa charged company owners and
executives with more than 9000 criminal counts of child labor violations, 86
and federal authorities charged them with criminal immigration violations. 87
Tellingly, federal authorities did not charge the owners with knowingly
employing illegal immigrants.88 Shortly after the raid, the business filed for
bankruptcy. 89
78. Press Release, ICE, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Agrees to Pay a Record $11 Million to ICE to
Settle Nationwide Worksite Enforcement Investigation (Mar. 18, 2005) (on file with the Marquette
Law Review).
79. Press Release, ICE, U.S. Uncovers Large-Scale Identity Theft Scheme Used By Illegal
Aliens to Gain Employment at Nationwide Meat Processor (Dec. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.visaserve.com/CM/Articles/CIS%20Press%20Release%20on%20Identity%20Theft.pdf.
80. Compare id. (reporting 1282 administrative detentions in the Swift raids) with Worksite
Factsheet, supra note 65 (reporting 1116 total administrative arrests in 2005 and 3667 in 2006).
81. Preston, supra note 69.
82. Affidavit of David M. Hoagland at 2, 7 (May 9, 2008), available at
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/assets/pdf/ice_application.pdf (suggesting that Source #1
contacted ICE in January 2006, nearly two-and-a-half years before the raid).
83. Id. at 7.
84. Preston, supra note 69.
85. Id.
86. Complaint, Iowa v. Agriprocessors, Inc., No. SMCR009340-9345 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Sept. 9,
2008),
available
at
http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/releases/sept_2008/Agriprocessors_COMPLAINT
.pdf.
87. Complaint, United States v. Agriprocessors, Inc., No. CR08-1324 LRR (N.D. Iowa Nov.
20, 2008), available at http://www.desmoinesregister.com/assets/pdf/AgriprocessorsIndictment.pdf.
88. Id.
89. Julia Preston, Large Iowa Meatpacker in Illegal Immigrant Raid Files For Bankruptcy,
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C. Other Strategies: Fraud, Technology, and Collaboration
In addition to deterrence, the government has tried a number of other
strategies to reduce the number of illegal immigrants in the workforce. First,
citing widespread fraud, it has ratcheted up document requirements and
increased the use of technology.90 Additionally, to achieve the above
objective, the government has tried to divide immigration regulation among a
variety of government agencies.
Many of the government’s recent immigration laws combined technology
and fiat to combat perceived fraud. Decades of government audits, studies,
and commissions concluded that the ―widespread use of fraudulent
documents‖ was the greatest factor undermining employer-based immigration
regulation.91 The first step of the government’s war on fraud was to reduce
the number of acceptable forms of identification. The INS began that process
in 1993 by proposing a rule that would have eliminated certain forms of
identification from the list of acceptable I-9 verification documents.92 In
1996, Congress stepped in and prohibited the use of other documents,
including birth certificates, as proof of worker eligibility. 93 Then, in each of
the following three years, the INS proposed increasing document
restrictions.94 In a similar vein, Congress passed the REAL ID Act of 2005,
requiring that all states verify the immigration status of its residents before
issuing them state identification or driver’s licenses. 95
The second prong of the government’s assault on fraud is technology. As
one example, the INS began to use technological advancements to prevent
fraud of its own identification documents.96 Similarly, Congress required that
the Social Security Administration (SSA) develop counterfeit-proof
documents in 1996. 97 Most significantly, however, the government has
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A21.
90. ILLEGAL ALIENS, supra note 47, at 9–12; IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 13,
at 5.
91. ILLEGAL ALIENS, supra note 47, at 3, 9.
92. Id. at 13–14.
93. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, § 412, 110 Stat. 3009-666 (1996) [hereinafter IIRIRA].
94. ILLEGAL ALIENS, supra note 47, at 14.
95. Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2000)). One of the many
collateral costs of this strategy, however, is less driver education and car insurance for illegal
immigrant motorists. David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L.
REV. 1359, 1382 (2007). It is difficult to determine the lawmakers’ purpose behind the REAL ID
Act because it was wedged into an emergency appropriations bill that funded both the Iraq War and
Tsunami relief. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on
Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005).
96. ILLEGAL ALIENS, supra note 47, at 15 (describing how the INS began using holograms on
its identification documents in 1997).
97. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 401, 110 Stat. 3009-655 (1996). Although in the end, the SSA did
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pinned its aspirations of immigration regulation to electronic employee
verification systems. 98 At the urging of Congress, the Attorney General first
introduced such a system in 1997.99 Known originally as ―Basic Pilot,‖100 it is
a voluntary tool by which employers can check an employee’s reported Social
Security number against an SSA database.101 Since its inception, it has been
met with qualified praise from government officials, 102 but with hesitation
from employers.103
Finally, the government has tried to split up the employer enforcement
duties among multiple government agencies. 104 But relying on other agencies
has proven difficult because immigration enforcement often conflicts with the
primary goals of the other agency. 105 Specifically, the DOL resisted
collaboration with the INS because it relied heavily on employee
complaints.106 Any involvement with INS, it was feared, would reduce
employees’ willingness to cooperate with the DOL. 107
Collaboration with the SSA has also proven difficult. Every year, the
employers of illegal aliens generate millions of W-2 forms that do not match
SSA records.108 In response, the SSA sends hundreds of thousands of ―no
match letters‖ to employers.109 In August 2007, the Department of Homeland
not put the cards into use.
98. See IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 13, at 42–44.
99. IIRIRA required the Attorney General to create a voluntary program for employers. Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 401, 110 Stat. 3009-655 (1996).
100. The name has since been changed to ―e-Verify.‖ Press Release, U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration
Servs.,
Fact
Sheet:
E-Verify
(Sept.
25,
2007),
available
at
http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/EVerifyFS25Sep07.pdf.
101. Id.; see also Stephen A. Brown, Comment, Illegal Immigrants In The Workplace: Why
Electronic Verification Benefits Employers, 8 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 349, 381–83 (2007) (detailing the
history of the project).
102. See, e.g., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 13, at 20 (The Government
Accountability Office concluded that it ―shows promise.‖); Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet:
Basic Pilot: A Clear and Reliable Way to Verify Employment Eligibility (July 5, 2006), available at
http://www.jbsswift.com/media/releases/White_House_Basic_Pilot_Fact_Sheet.pdf
(―It’s
working.‖).
103. By 2004, only 2300 employers had signed up for the system.
IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 13, at 20–21. By 2007, that number had reportedly grown to 23,000.
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., supra note 100. In fact, when INS originally failed to meet
its target participation numbers, it credited employer reluctance. ILLEGAL ALIENS, supra note 47, at
12.
104. See Tanger, supra note 18, at 66.
105. Id. at 71.
106. ILLEGAL ALIENS, supra note 47, at 16, 19.
107. Id.
108. Roger Tsai, The Immigration Crackdown on Employers, BUS. L. TODAY 45, 47 (July–
Aug., 2007). But because typographical errors or name changes may prompt a no-match letter, the
letter does not prove that a worker is unauthorized.
109. NAT ’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., WHAT THE ORDER GRANTING A PRELIMINARY
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Security (DHS) issued a rule stating that all letters were constructive
knowledge of an employee’s unauthorized status, unless the employer
followed its safe-harbor provisions.110 But DHS withdrew the rule by the end
of the year, after labor and civil liberties groups challenged the law in court. 111
Thus, it is not clear how SSA’s resources may be used to regulate employers.
D. Proposed Legislative Changes
Although immigration enforcement is controlled by executive agencies
like ICE, legislators have proposed a variety of laws that would affect the
agencies’ tactics.112 Four bills proposed in 2007 and 2008 contained as wide a
variety of first-order policy goals 113 as second-order regulatory schemes. 114
Two were immigration reform bills of 2007, one from the House and one
from the Senate. Both bills focused on fraud prevention through document
restrictions and increased technology,115 and the House bill supplemented this
effort with heightened punishments for knowing violations of the law. 116 Next
was a narrower 2008 bill, codifying aliens’ rights during detention and
limiting the government’s enforcement tactics.117 The final one was a DHS
appropriations bill, in which legislators sought to direct a large portion of

INJUNCTION MEANS FOR THE DHS RULE ABOUT SOCIAL SECURITY ―NO-MATCH‖ (2007) (stating
that the SSA planned to send 140,000 letters); David P. McCauley, Employing Foreign Workers in
the U.S. Construction Industry: Possibilities, Pitfalls, and Lessons Learned, 27 CONSTRUCTION
LAW. 17, 21 (2007) (reporting that 900,000 letters were sent because of 6 million to 7 million
unmatched W-2s in 2002); Tsai, supra note 108, at 47 (reporting that 126,250 letters were sent out of
7.5 million unmatched W-2s in 2003).
110. 72 Fed. Reg. 45,611, 45,612–13 (Aug. 15, 2007) (amending 8 CFR § 274a.1(l)(1) (2007)).
The safe-harbor provisions give an employer thirty days to resolve any discrepancy with its
employee, by reviewing documents to check for errors and confirming the correction with the SSA or
DHS. Id.
111. Mary Lou Pickel, Firms Get Reprieve; ID Plan on Hold, ATLANTA JOURNALCONSTITUTION, Dec. 25, 2007, at 1A; Preston, supra note 3.
112. See, e.g., Protect Citizens and Residents from Unlawful Raids and Detention Act, S. 3594,
110th Cong. (2008); Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2009, H.R. 6947, 110th
Cong. (2008); Secure Borders FIRST (For Integrity, Reform, Safety, and Anti-Terrorism) Act, H.R.
2954, 110th Cong. (2007); Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2007, S. 1639, 110th
Cong. tit. VIII, subtit. A.
113. For example, the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act provided for interpreters to
help screen for asylum claimants. S. 1639, § 142(d). In contrast, the Secure Borders FIRST Act
would, for example, deny entry to all foreign nationals of countries that refuse to accept their own
deported nationals, H.R. 2954, § 108, and would declare English the official language, id. § 503.
114. See, e.g., S. 3594, § 4(f)(1)(A) (forbidding immigration authorities from conducting raids
near churches or schools); H.R. 2954, § 305 (increasing punishments for employers who knowingly
hire illegal immigrants).
115. See H.R. 2954, § 303; S. 1639, § 302(a).
116. H.R. 2954, § 305.
117. S. 3594, § 4.
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ICE’s funding away from immigration raids. 118 None of the above laws were
enacted before the end of the 2007–2008 session of Congress.
The Senate’s 2007 immigration reformation bill would have modified
employer regulation in four main ways. 119 First, the law would have
mandated participation in an electronic worker eligibility program. 120 Second,
it would have made illegal the ―reckless‖ employment of unauthorized
aliens.121 Reducing the minimum culpability for a conviction would have
reduced the costs of investigating and prosecuting employers.122 Third, the
bill would have further tightened the documentation requirements facing
employers.123 Specifically, the law would have required employers to demand
a state issued driver’s license or identification card.124 Finally, the bill would
have created a voluntary program by which employers could verify their
employees’ employment eligibility by submitting employee fingerprints to
DHS.125
The House’s immigration reform bill was conceptually similar in its focus
on fraud but was accompanied by increased fines for employers. 126 First, the
bill would have created a national ―Employment Eligibility Database‖ under
the management of DHS.127 The database would have contained more
information than e-Verify but would have built on its framework to the extent
possible. 128 Second, the bill would have required the SSA to create new
Social Security cards.129 The cards would have had to include a photograph
and an encrypted, machine-readable strip for added security. 130 Employers
would be forbidden from hiring without requiring this card and verifying it

118. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act 2009, H.R. 6947, 110th Cong.
(2008).
119. S. 1639, 110th Cong. § 302 (2007) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)).
120. Id. § 302(a).
121. Id. (although knowledge would still be required to incur criminal sanctions).
122. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5–17 (1987).
123. Compare S. 1639, § 302(a) with 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(B)–(D) (2006) (S. 1639, § 302(a)
allows employers to rely on identity documents only if they contain higher levels of anti-fraud
protections than currently required in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1).).
124. S. 1639, § 302(a). Here the bill included a redundant verification process because the only
acceptable state IDs were ones that were issued in compliance with the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 302 (codified in 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2000)).
125. S. 1639, § 307.
126. Secure Borders FIRST Act of 2007, H.R. 2954, 110th Cong. § 305.
127. Id. § 303(a).
128. Id. § 303(a)–(b).
129. Id. § 302(a).
130. Id. § 302(a)(ii). Although the bill later suggests that employers would have access to card
readers, it is not clear how or when this would happen—only that the readers should be provided at
―minimal cost to [employers].‖ Id. § 304(a).

604

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[92:591

against the DHS database.131 Finally, the bill would have dramatically
increased the penalties for employer violations.132 Most of the minimum
authorized fines would have been increased ten to twenty times, 133 and the bill
also required a minimum one-year imprisonment for repeat offenders. 134
In September 2008, Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey introduced a
bill limiting enforcement tactics during immigration enforcement actions. 135
For one, the bill would have required DHS (and therefore ICE) to avoid
apprehending individuals near churches, schools, courts, hospitals, and similar
―community institutions.‖136 Before large-scale raids, ICE would have been
required to notify state and local child-welfare services.137 After raids, the bill
would have required the government to screen out and parole members of
―vulnerable population groups‖ like primary caregivers and victims of human
trafficking. 138 To ensure administrative compliance, the bill would have
installed an ombudsman within DHS.139
The House version of the 2009 DHS appropriations bill reflects a more
indirect effect. Specifically, the bill would direct a large portion of ICE’s
funding toward the arrest of criminal aliens. 140 Although this is not a direct
indictment of worksite raids, it necessarily de-prioritizes them as an ICE
strategy. In fact, the House Appropriations Committee recommended a slight
decrease in funding for worksite enforcement. 141
IV. SOCIAL NORMS AND EMPLOYER REGULATION
To evaluate any of the above proposals, one must determine why the
government has been so unsuccessful at keeping immigrants from getting
jobs. Widespread document fraud is undoubtedly one such reason. Forged
documents effectively shift the risk of prosecution from employers to
employees because employers face punishment only for ―knowing‖
131. Id. § 304(a).
132. Id. § 305.
133. Id. Indeed, a paperwork violation would carry a minimum $1000 fine. Id.
134. Id. § 305(4).
135. Protect Citizens and Residents from Unlawful Raids and Detention Act, S. 3594, 110th
Cong. (2008).
136. Id. § 4(f).
137. Id. § 5(3).
138. Id. § 7.
139. Id. § 10.
140. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2009, H.R. 6947, 110th Cong.
(2008).
141. See H.R. REP. No 110-862, at 51–52 (2008). The House Appropriations Committee
recommended that ICE allocate $90 million toward worksite enforcement. Id. This would be a
slight decrease in funding from the $92 million budgeted for 2008. Id. For some context, the
Postville, Iowa, raid, discussed above, cost more than $5 million. Petroski, supra note 71.
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violations.142 And given the high quantity of labor demanded at the federal
minimum wage, immigration seems almost inevitable. 143 In fact, one
commentator has argued that ―market forces are simply too strong to be
overcome by standard responses of strengthening border enforcement or
renewing employer sanction efforts.‖144
Lost in the discussion of fraud and wages, however, is any discussion of
social norms. The fact is, many employers deliberately violate federal laws.
Even if new fraud prevention technology worked perfectly, such technology
may have little impact on employers who feel economically compelled and
morally justified when hiring illegal immigrants. To those employers, the
twin strategies of deterrence and fraud prevention may not be effective.
Although the data are not sufficient to determine the number of such
employers, one can be reasonably certain of their existence.
A. The Model
An increasing body of literature145 explains legal compliance as a product
of social norms.146 Indeed, social norms often influence behavior more than
―instrumental‖ influences (e.g., risk of legal sanction).147 Thus, the decisions
to comply with the law rarely reflect a rational calculation of risk versus
reward.148 Instead, the decisions reflect internalized notions of morality or

142. Employees who use false documents to get a job often are prosecuted under felony
identity theft laws intended to deter theft. John Leland, Some ID Theft Is Not for Profit, But to Get a
Job, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2006, at A1. But DHS Secretary Chertoff sees the relationship between
immigration laws and identity theft laws differently: ―[E]ntering the country illegally can serve as a
gateway to other crimes including identity theft and document fraud.‖ Press Release, ICE, ICE
Makes Additional Criminal Arrests at Swift & Company Plants (July 11, 2007), available at
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/070711washingtondc.htm.
143. See M. Isabel Medina, Wal-Mart, Immigrant Workers and the U.S. Government—A Case
of Split Personality, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1443, 1459 (2007).
144. Hing, supra note 17, at 1401.
145. See generally, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Ben Depoorter
& Sven Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement: The Case Against Copyright Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV.
1127 (2005); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338 (1997); Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV.
391 (2000); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV .
1781 (2000).
146. Richard McAdams defines social norms as ―informal social regularities that individuals
feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external nonlegal sanctions, or both.‖ McAdams, supra note 145, at 340.
147. See Depoorter & Vanneste, supra note 145, at 1139; Meares, supra note 145, at 392.
148. Indeed, risk perception and calculation are distorted by so many cultural and normative
factors that it is questionable whether hiring decisions would appropriately respond to regulation.
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741
(2008).
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legitimacy. 149 For example, people pay their taxes even though the risk of an
audit multiplied by the costs of potential penalties is significantly less than the
cost of paying.150 They do so in part because of social norms. 151
Although norms can be influenced by a variety of factors, including the
law, they are very difficult to engineer.152 On one hand, ―individuals prefer to
carry out their legal obligations.‖ 153 Thus, when lawmakers call something
(or someone) illegal, it has an effect on an individual’s internalized ―moral
appraisal‖ of related behaviors.154 However, the normative force of a law may
be overcome by both internal and external influences. Internally, norms may
be influenced by an individual’s desire to avoid cognitive dissonance. 155 That
is, individuals sometimes adjust their beliefs to conform with their behavior,
thus reducing the uncomfortable cognitive dissonance between belief and
behavior.156 Externally, norms are shaped by the perceived actions and beliefs
of an individual’s peers.157 Therefore, the public enforcement of a law may
even be counterproductive if it demonstrates widespread violation by one’s
peers.158
All of the above influences can be found in the case of Internet piracy. 159
A 2005 study revealed two reasons why heavy-handed copyright enforcement
against file-sharers is counterproductive.160 First, the public enforcement of
copyrights raised awareness among inexperienced downloaders of what their
peers were doing.161 Second, harsh copyright enforcement prompted a
backlash from experienced downloaders, whose anti-copyright norms were

149. See Meares, supra note 145, at 398–99.
150. Posner, supra note 145, at 1783.
151. Id. at 1785.
152. Id. at 1791–92; see also Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the
Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607–09 (2000).
153. Kahan, supra note 152, at 612–13 (describing the influence of a behavior’s legal status as
―significant, albeit modest‖).
154. Id.; see also Nigel Walker & Michael Argyle, Does the Law Affect Moral Judgments?,
4 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 570, 570 (1963).
155. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1–31 (1957).
156. Id. at 6.
157. Walker & Argyle, supra note 154, at 576–77 (noting the effect of perceived public
opinion on individuals’ moral appraisal of using obscene language in public).
158. The classic example is the daycare center that introduced a fine to penalize late parents;
rather than deterring them, however, it resulted in later parents. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A
Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000).
159. Depoorter & Vanneste, supra note 145, at 1157–58.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1157.
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strengthened by heavy-handed tactics.162 Smaller punishments, however,
caused less of a normative backlash among experienced downloaders.163
Indeed, the results of the file-sharing study are predicted by Dan Kahan’s
―sticky norms‖ model. 164 According to Kahan, if the law condemns a
punishment ―substantially more than does the typical decisionmaker, the
decisionmaker’s personal aversion to condemning too severely will dominate
her inclination to enforce the law.‖ 165 This principle expands on Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s statement that ―a law which punished conduct which
would not be blameworthy in the average member of the community would be
too severe for that community to bear.‖166 And Kahan takes the point one step
further, arguing that sometimes the more effective laws are those that Kahan
refers to as ―gentle nudges‖ rather than ―hard shoves.‖167 For example, he
contrasts American smoking laws with European ones. 168 The American
model of ―zoning or segmentation‖ represented a gentle nudge, pushing
smokers away from non-smokers and nurturing the stigma of smoking. 169 In
contrast, Europeans ―contemptuously def[y]‖ the harder public smoking
bans.170
Whether these decisionmakers are judges, jurors, voters, or small business
owners, their aversion for excessive enforcement may have any number of ill
effects. Jurors, for example, may refuse to convict a defendant, judges may
impose reduced sentences, or lawmakers may overturn the law entirely. 171
Thus, the more effective punishment would be tailored to match the typical
decisionmaker’s expectations.172
B. Norm Data
Although empirical data gauging immigration norms are hard to come by,
evidence suggests that some groups have developed pro-illegal immigrant
norms. From farmers to Catholics to Hispanics, many Americans seem
reluctant to condemn illegal immigrants or their employers. That is not to say
that employer sanctions do not have support, or even that most Americans
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1158.
164. Id. at 1153; see Kahan, supra note 152, at 607–08.
165. Kahan, supra note 152, at 608.
166. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 50 (1909).
167. Kahan, supra note 152, at 608.
168. Id. at 626.
169. Id. at 627 (Zoning or segmentation includes indoor smoking bans or the enforcement of
smoking and nonsmoking sections.).
170. Id. at 626.
171. Id. at 607.
172. Id. at 608.
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would resist employer sanctions. But some would, and perhaps enough to
present a sticky norms problem that would make heightened enforcement
efforts counterproductive.
On one hand, immigration laws do have a modest effect on people’s moral
appraisal of immigrants.173 A nationwide poll in 2007 indicated that forty-six
percent of Americans believe that legal immigrants have had a positive effect
on their community, but only twenty-one percent of people said the same of
illegal immigrants.174 Because the only difference between the two questions
was the legal status of the immigrants, the twenty-five percentage point
disparity between the responses may reflect a moral appraisal based on
immigrants’ legal status. Capturing this moral appraisal is the slogan
championed by some anti-immigration advocates: ―What part of illegal don’t
you understand?‖175
On the other hand, the poll highlights the complexity of the relationship
between norms and immigration law. It shows that a minority of Americans
believes that illegal immigrants have a positive effect on their communities. 176
And because norms differ greatly among communities, or peer groups, 177 one
would expect this number to be higher in some communities than in others.
For example, a 2007 survey found that seventy-five percent of Hispanics
believe that illegal immigrants help the American economy. 178 Although that
survey does not precisely track the one above, the enormous disparity between
results suggests that the condemning power of immigration laws may be
lower within Hispanic communities.
Further evidence of pro-immigrant norms may be found in the public
positions of certain religious organizations. Some such groups have made
highly publicized stands with the immigrant community—at times in conflict
with federal laws. 179 The Catholic Church, for example, has been said to
―openly support[] immigrants’ rights activists, and encourage[] parishioners to

173. See L.A. Times/Bloomberg Poll, Nov. 30–Dec. 3, 2007, available at
http://www.pollingreport.com/immigration.htm.
174. Id.
175. See Mark Krikorian, Amnesty, Again, NAT’L REV., Jan. 26, 2004, at 28, 29; see also Julia
Preston, Employers Fight Tough Measures on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2008, at A1 (citing
the phrase’s use in Arizona).
176. L.A. Times/Bloomberg Poll, supra note 173.
177. See Depoorter & Vanneste, supra note 145, at 1157–58 (showing a significant difference
between the copyright norms of downloaders and non-downloaders).
178. PEW HISP. CTR., 2007 NATIONAL SURVEY OF LATINOS: AS ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION ISSUE
HEATS
UP,
HISPANICS
FEEL
A
CHILL
21
(2007),
available
at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/84.pdf [hereinafter HISPANICS FEEL A CHILL].
179. See Paulette Chu Miniter, Op-Ed., Is the Catholic Church Pro-Immigrant? You Bet, USA
TODAY, Aug. 21, 2006, at 11A; Kari Lydersen, Church Is Sanctuary as Deportation Nears, WASH.
POST, Aug. 17, 2006, at A10.
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participate in protests against current policies.‖ 180 After two large Houstonarea worksite raids in 2008, the director of the Catholic Legal Immigration
Network compared the impact to that of a hurricane. 181 Similarly, a Methodist
church in Chicago made national news in 2006 when it provided refuge to an
immigrant who had been ordered removed. 182 Some commentators have even
accused the church of encouraging illegal immigration. 183 In fact, when Pope
Benedict XVI came to the United States in April 2008, House Representative
Tom Tancredo accused him of ―faith-based marketing‖ to HispanicAmericans and suggested that the Pope’s motives ―may have less to do with
spreading the Gospel than they do about recruiting new members of the
Church.‖184
Whether the above religious institutions actively shape or more passively
gauge community norms, their positions suggest that pro-immigrant norms
exist within certain communities. Such norms may motivate individuals to
openly and directly undermine the enforcement of immigration laws by
providing sanctuary to aliens ordered removed. 185 But the norms may also
operate in less direct ways. Specifically, pro-immigrant norms may translate
into anti-enforcement norms. Employers sympathetic to immigrants may be
more likely to hire them. Jurors who believe that illegal immigrants benefit
their communities may be less likely to convict their employers. Although
few data exist measuring immigration enforcement norms, there are a few
signs of anti-enforcement norms.
According to studies conducted in 2007 and 2008, a substantial portion of
the population disapproves of worksite raids. 186 Seventy-five percent of
Hispanics and forty-two percent of non-Hispanics disapprove of worksite
raids.187 Seventy percent of Hispanics oppose criminal sanctions for
employers.188 Although opposition to such enforcement tactics is higher
180. Rebecca van Uitert, Undocumented Immigrants in the United States: A Discussion of
Catholic Social Thought and “Mormon Social Thought” Principles, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 277,
287 (2007).
181. Stewart M. Powell, Immigration Official Slammed over Crackdowns: ICE Chief Tells
Conference that Agency Is Enforcing Congress’ Laws, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, July 30, 2008, at A4.
182. See Lydersen, supra note 179.
183. Miniter, supra note 179 (citing CNN fixture Lou Dobbs of accusing the church of seeking
―to add a few folks to those pews‖).
184. Daniel J. Wakin & Julia Preston, Speaking Up for Immigrants, Pontiff Touches a Flash
Point, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2008, at A1.
185. See Lydersen, supra note 179.
186. HISPANICS FEEL A CHILL, supra note 178, at 13; PEW HISP. CTR., 2008 NATIONAL
SURVEY OF LATINOS: HISPANICS SEE THEIR SITUATION IN U.S. DETERIORATING; OPPOSE KEY
IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT
MEASURES
2
(2008),
available
at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/93.pdf [hereinafter HISPANICS OPPOSE KEY MEASURES].
187. HISPANICS FEEL A CHILL, supra note 178, at 13.
188. HISPANICS OPPOSE KEY MEASURES, supra note 186, at 2.
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among younger, less-educated Hispanics, disapproval is hardly limited to that
group.189
Recently, there have been small signs of a political backlash against
worksite raids. In the summer of 2008, the mayors of Los Angeles, Oakland,
and Seattle requested that the United States Conference of Mayors approve a
resolution condemning the immigration raids. 190 The conference passed a
resolution that called on ICE to focus entirely upon criminal and national
security matters until Congress passed a comprehensive immigration reform
act.191 At the very least, the mayors requested that ICE focus its worksite
enforcement efforts on companies with a ―history or reasonable suspicion of
engaging in exploitative practices.‖192
This backlash may even be visible in Washington, particularly in the two
2008 bills described in Part III.D. Both the Senate bill expanding immigrant
rights and the House DHS appropriations bill limit worksite enforcement
measures to some degree. 193 These proposals may be the product of an antienforcement backlash. On the other hand, the Senate counterpart to the DHS
appropriations bill did not limit the agency’s worksite enforcement efforts. 194
To the contrary, the Senate Appropriations Committee stated that it was
―pleased‖ with ICE’s recent worksite enforcement efforts and recommended
that an additional 108 full-time employees be dedicated to such efforts. 195
Furthermore, both of the immigration reform bills of 2007 contained
increased worksite enforcement tools. 196
Although a thorough, methodologically sound study would greatly
enhance understanding of norms and immigration laws, certain tentative
conclusions may be drawn from the existing data. For one, anti-enforcement
norms exist among certain groups of Americans. 197 Such norms seem to exist
among Hispanics, and, if so, this creates a significant enforcement problem.
As of 2007, the Small Business Administration estimates that Hispanics own

189. Id. at 2, 4.
190. Emily Bazar, Three Mayors Fight Immigration Raids, USA TODAY, June 20, 2008, at 5A.
191. U.S. Conference of Mayors, Calling for Comprehensive Immigration Reform Which
Promotes the Reunification of Families, Provides Legal Status with a Path to Earned Citizenship, and
a Plan for Current and Future Immigrant Workers, Res. (June 20–24, 2008), available at
http://www.usmayors.org/resolutions/76th_conference/csj_14.asp.
192. U.S. Conference of Mayors, U.S. Immigration and Customs Worksite Enforcement, Res.
(June 20–24, 2008), available at http://www.usmayors.org/resolutions/76th_conference/csj_15.asp.
193. See supra notes 135–41 and accompanying text.
194. See Robert Byrd, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill 2009, S. REP. No.
110-396, at 44 (2008).
195. Id.
196. See supra notes 119–34 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text.
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nearly 200,000, or almost four percent, of American employer firms. 198 But
such norms likely also exist among the employers of unskilled laborers who
perceive widespread violation by their peers. 199 If that is true, heavy-handed
enforcement tactics may be as counterproductive against the employers of
illegal aliens as they were against Internet file-sharers.
There are several possible explanations for anti-enforcement norms.
Internally, employers may be seeking to avoid cognitive dissonance. 200 The
economic incentive that employers have to employ illegal aliens 201 may lead
employers to internalize their behavior and adapt their norms accordingly. 202
Externally, employers of unskilled laborers perceive widespread violations by
their peers.203 A 2007 New York Times article quoted farmers as ―saying at
least 70 percent of farmworkers are illegal immigrants.‖204 And the
perception of widespread violations erodes the norms that underlie the laws
themselves.205
Among Hispanics, anti-enforcement norms may have an additional
explanation. A study shows that a majority of Hispanic-Americans believe
that the recent immigration debate has made life more difficult for them. 206 A
majority of Hispanics worry about the deportation (or removal, as it is now
called) of themselves, a friend, or family member.207 And eighty-three
percent of Hispanics think discrimination is a problem in the workplace, and
fifty-eight percent consider it a major problem. 208
C. Analysis
Given the existing anti-enforcement norms, the current employerenforcement strategy is not likely to be effective. The government’s highprofile raids may encourage an anti-enforcement backlash, especially when
accompanied by criminal prosecutions of employers and employees alike. In
fact, the high-profile raids seem perfectly tailored to amplify anti-enforcement
198. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., MINORITIES IN BUSINESS: A DEMOGRAPHIC REVIEW OF
MINORITY
BUSINESS
OWNERSHIP
5
tbl.3
(2007),
available
at
http://www.sba.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/sba_homepage/tools_reports_rs298.pdf.
199. At least, norm theories would predict that.
200. See generally FESTINGER, supra note 155.
201. See Manns, supra note 42, at 945 (―One of the fundamental challenges facing immigration
enforcement is the fact that employers and undocumented aliens share an interest in subverting
immigration laws.‖).
202. See FESTINGER, supra note 155, at 19.
203. See, e.g., Preston, supra note 38.
204. Id.
205. See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
206. HISPANICS FEEL A CHILL, supra note 178, at 16.
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norms. By coupling employer enforcement measures with large-scale
criminal prosecutions and removal of immigrants, the measures arouse the
anxieties of the Hispanic population. By bankrupting large employers, the
measures also jeopardize the economic future of the communities that depend
on them. An effective employer-enforcement strategy would minimize antienforcement norms and more closely match communities’ condemnation of
the behavior. Such a strategy would require collaboration between the
legislature and regulators.
First, the legislature should rewrite employer-sanctioning laws to reduce
the cost of prosecuting employers. With lower costs, federal regulators would
not need to make waves with each investigation. They could target smaller
employers and seek smaller penalties, rather than seeking headlines every few
months with a large raid. There are several ways that the law could be
rewritten to reduce investigatory costs. The simplest legislative rewrite would
be to reduce the mental state required for the offense. 209 However, as the
mental state decreases, the risk of employer discrimination increases.
Employers fearing strict liability, for example, may not hire any immigrants at
all. Recklessness or negligence would probably be a better standard, and for
that reason, the Senate’s 2007 immigration reform bill was on the right
track.210 Another way of reducing enforcement costs is to provide better tools
to employers to verify the status of their employees. With such tools
available, including anti-fraud identity documents and employment-eligibility
verification databases, the government could more easily prove employer
culpability. Both the House and Senate took steps in this direction with their
immigration reform proposals.211
Next, with reduced investigative costs, the government could adopt a
regulatory policy that minimizes anti-enforcement sentiment. A critical
aspect of this new policy would be decoupling employer-enforcement raids
from illegal alien detention and prosecution. The government would reduce
the negative impact on the community if it investigated and fined businesses
without detaining hundreds of employees at the same time. Another aspect of
this new policy would be seeking smaller punishments that more accurately
reflect the condemnation of the community. In some communities, the mere
publication of a violation may result in shaming and loss of patronage. In
others, administrative fines of a few hundred dollars may be appropriate.
Finally, the new policy should contain protections for the community like

209. See Tanger, supra note 18, at 60–61 (proposing strict corporate liability).
210. Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2007, S. 1639, 110th Cong. § 302(a)
(reducing the standard to recklessness).
211. See supra notes 123–31 and accompanying text.
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those contained in the bill proposed by Senator Menendez. 212 Social services
should be alerted before a raid, the raids should not be conducted near
churches, schools, or courts, and primary caregivers should be quickly
released on parole.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has suggested that norms may be frustrating immigration
enforcement. If that is the case, the government’s heavy-handed deterrence
strategy may be not only ineffective, but also in fact counterproductive. The
collision of government policy and social norms may be averted, however,
without abandoning employer regulation altogether. Effectively calibrating
penalties and enforcement strategies will require more studies and discussions
than the current academic and political debate currently contains.
Finally, although this Comment has not taken a position on any first-order
immigration issues, these issues logically affect immigration norms. A
complete separation between first- and second-order issues is not realistic. If,
for example, employers could hire guest workers to fill their positions, but
simply refused to pay the administrative fees to do so, a community would
likely condemn this action more severely than an employer who did not have
the option of hiring a guest worker. Thus, second-order immigration reform
would be most effective if accompanied by first-order reform.
BENJAMIN CROUSE
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